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Chapter 1
Introduction
This paper aims at a comparison of the diﬀerent argumentative strategies
employed by Aristotle and Ptolemy in their approaches to geocentrism
through an analysis of their discussion of the centrality of the Earth in
De caelo II, 13-14 and Almagest, I, 3-7. The divergence does not concern
only secondary issues but rather the epistemology underlying the theories
of these two authors, and this aﬀects also the meaning of theses on which
they apparently agree. As we shall argue, this diﬀerence potentially entails
momentous consequences concerning the justiﬁcation and the acceptance
of fundamental astronomical concepts.
The epistemological distance between the two main “authorities” of
classical cosmology was intensively debated in the Middle Ages and Re-
naissance1. It was even crystallized as a disciplinary separation between
the academic teaching of “physical” astronomy (that is, the doctrine on
the heavens from a natural-philosophical perspective) and “mathemati-
cal” astronomy. In twelfth-century Moorish Spain, Ibn Rushd (Latinized
Averroes) denounced the discrepancy between the homocentric heavenly
mechanism propounded by Aristotle in De caelo and Metaphysics, XII,
on the one hand, and the mathematical devices (epicycles, eccentrics and
equants) employed by Ptolemy. He therefore accused Ptolemaic astronomy
to be at odds with natural philosophy since it renounced physical tenabil-
ity for computational convenience. His contemporary al-Bitruji (Latinized
Alpetragius) even sought to reform mathematical astronomy in accordance
with homocentrism, that is, he reduced all celestial motion to a mecha-
nism of concentric spheres. His book on heavenly motions, translated into
Latin by Michael Scot as De motibus caelorum, had a great impact in
1The standard reference for this issue is Pierre Duhem, To Save the Phenomena: An
Essay on the Idea of Physical Theory from Plato to Galileo (Chicago and London
1969), although the author’s attempt to interpret the history of physics and astronomy
from the perspective of twentieth-century epistemology (in particular conventionalism)
is completely outdated. For some criticism of Duhem’s anachronism see for instance
Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein “Realism and Instrumentalism in Sixteenth
Century Astronomy: A Reappraisal,” Perspectives on Science 6/3 (1998), pp. 232–258.
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Christian Europe up to the Renaissance. It should be noted that it was
republished in 1531 in Venice shortly before analogous works of Paduan
Aristotelians appeared: Giovan Battista Amico’s De motibus corporum
corporum coelestium iuxta principia peripatetica sine eccentricis et epicy-
clis (On the Motion of Heavenly Bodies in Accordance with Peripatetic
Principles, that is, without Eccentrics and Epicycles, 1537 and Paris 1540)
and Girolamo Fracastoro’s Homocentrica sive de stellis (Homocentrics or
on Stars, 1538).
In spite of this well known criticism of Ptolemy’s “abstract mathe-
matics”, it was commonly assumed that his conceptions could be brought
back to an essentially Aristotelian cosmology. As a matter of fact, Aristo-
tle and Ptolemy were in agreement relative to the sphericity of the Earth
and its rest at the center of the universe, as well as to the sphericity and
the circular motion of the heavens. Hence, the physical considerations
of the philosopher and the mathematical arguments of the Alexandrine
astronomer could strengthen each other concerning these central issues.
What is more, the Almagest began with a mention of Aristotle’s partition
of speculative knowledge into the three disciplines (mathematics, physics
and theology) and repeated some (alas misleading) physical theories of
Aristotle, as we shall see. In this concordant spirit, Sacrobosco, for one,
assumed the essential concordance between Aristotle and Ptolemy and
could therefore rely on both authorities in his (very) elementary introduc-
tion to spherical astronomy which, in spite of its intrinsic scientiﬁc limits,
was one of the most successful textbooks ever. Beginning in the thirteenth
century, an ‘Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmology’ emerged, bringing together
elements from both classical authorities, and this uniﬁed geocentric world-
view was assumed by most philosophers and theologians.2 In his narrative
of the Copernican revolution, Kuhn therefore felt legitimized to talk about
an Aristotelian-Ptolemaic ‘paradigm’ which Copernicus’ De revolutionibus
was to undermine. By contrast, we will focus on the premisses instead
of the conclusions of De caelo and Almagest regardless of the historical
fact that these sources presented close cosmological views on the Earth’s
position.
These considerations on geocentrism can be indirectly relevant for the
birth of mathematical geography.3 This discipline required, in fact, three
2Cf. C. Panti, Moti, virtù e motori celesti nella cosmologia di Roberto Grossatesta.
Studio ed edizione dei trattati “De sphera”, “De cometis”, “De motu supercelestium”
(Firenze 2001).
3On that I. Tupikova, M. Schemmel and K. Geus are preparing a paper: “From
Celestial to Terrestrial Mapping: Preconditions and Consequences of Measurements of
the Size of the Earth in Antiquity’,” in Spatial Thinking and External Representation.
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historically interconnected cosmological assumptions: the spherical form
of the starry heaven (transported in circular motion), the sphericity of the
Earth and, last but not least, its centrality. As Szabó and Maula argued4,
the spherical conception of the heavens originated in Greece from technical
and geographical premisses, namely the employment of the gnomon at a
diﬀerent latitude than the Babylonians. It was therefore in the Greek and
Hellenistic culture that spherical astronomy established itself. Ptolemy
beneﬁted from it in his geographical work, as witnessed by the fact that
his geographical references (latitudes and longitudes) are projections from
the heavens onto the terrestrial surface. In the light of this historical in-
terpretation, geocentrism and heavenly sphericity gains new interest as (at
least partly) ‘false premisses’ which are rich with epistemic consequences.
Before we confront the arguments for geocentricism in Ptolemy and
Aristotle, we shall clarify the meaning that we attach to some particu-
larly relevant termini. ‘Cosmology’ means for us a general theory of the
world as a whole. It concerns the dimensions, the structure, the order
and the nature of the universe. We will call ‘mathematical astronomy’ a
treatment of the heavenly phenomena based on geometry and arithmetic
(thus assuming the traditional Greek perspective). Besides computation,
a relevant feature of what we shall call ‘mathemaical astronomy’ is the
geometrical modeling of the celestial phenomena. Moreover, we shall not
assume the term ‘physics’ in the modern sense, but rather in a restricted
Aristotelian meaning of a qualitative doctrine of motion based on causal
explanation. Within an Aristotelian horizon, it could be regarded as a
synonym of ‘natural philosophy’. In accordance with this terminology,
‘physical astronomy’ shall refer to a qualitative doctrine of the heavens
providing causal explanations according to philosophical assumptions on
motion as well as on the nature of the Earth and the heavens. Moreover,
we will call a ‘cosmological approach’ that treatment of the world which
begins with a rational investigation of the whole and makes the theory of
motion, in particular the motion on Earth, dependent on this general con-
ception. On the other hand, we will call a ‘physical approach” that which
begins with consideration of the observable phenomena on Earth relative
to motion, gravitation and such, to conclude also about the structure of
the world as a whole. As we will argue, this distinction can conveniently
Towards a Historical Epistemology of Space, ed. M. Schemmel, Max Plank Research
Library for the History and Development of Knowledge.
4Szabó and Maula, Enklima. Untersuchungen zur Frühgeschichte der antiken griechis-
chen Astronomie, Geographie und der Sehnentafel (Athen, 1982).
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encapsulate the diﬀerent approaches of Aristotle and Ptolemy to the issue
with which we are presently concerned: geocentricism.
A series of seminars organized by TOPOI and held at the MPIWG-
Berlin beginning in 2010 aims at clarifying the emergence and the consol-
idation of geocentrism and cosmological sphericity as a hegemonic world-
view from Antiquity to the Early Modern Period. This paper in particular
was conceived during a workshop which took place at the Department I
on 25 January 2011.
Chapter 2
Aristotle
Aristotle’s considerations on the Earth are presented in the conclusive part
of the second book of De caelo as was transmitted to us. These chapters
(II, 13 and 14) show a strong self-suﬃciency and can be regarded as an
autonomous treatise on the Earth.
It should be remembered that all extant works of the so-called corpus
Aristotelicum are the notes of the lectures which the philosopher held at
the Lyceum and were later edited by his followers. These writings often
resulted from the collection of short treatises, therefore titles are often only
labels put on miscellaneous writings on close subjects. This is the case also
with De caelo. In spite of its title, this work does not exclusively deal with
the heavens. It is rather made of several distinct parts: books I (or A)
and II (or B) on the universe as a whole and its parts, book III (or  ) on
sublunary elements, and book IV (or ) on lightness and heaviness. The
chapters 13 and 14 of the second book are apparently a juxtaposition which
occurred at the moment of the assemblage of De caelo as a uniﬁed work.
This could be witnessed by the summary at the beginning of book III, a
survey on the precedent sections in which the monograph on the Earth
is omitted: “We have treated earlier of the ﬁrst heaven and its parts,
and also of the stars which are visible in it, their composition and natural
characteristics, and the fact that they are ungenerated and indestructible.”
Alberto Jori pointed to the relative autonomy of the section on celestial
bodies (II, 7–12) and that on the Earth (II, 12–13) in his introduction
to De caelo. He explained the existence and the insertion of these two
monographs by the fact that they complete the treatment of the universe
as a whole which is the subject of the ﬁrst book and of the ﬁrst part of the
second.1 Paul Moraux already divided the ﬁrst two books of De caelo in
three parts: 1. Περὶ τῆς παντὸς φύσεως (on the whole nature, I and II,1-
6), 2. Περὶ τῶν καλουμένων ἄστρων (on the so-called celestial bodies, II,
1See Alberto Jori, Introduzione to Aristotle, Il cielo (Santarcangelo di Romagna, 1999),
pp. 13–14, riedited as Erläuterung, in Aristoteles, Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, vol.
12, Über den Himmel, p. 123.
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6–12) and 3. Περὶ τῆς γῆς (on the Earth, II,12–13). He claimed, however,
that the treatise on the Earth is an essential part of Aristotle’s books A
and B “als ein Ganzes.”2 For our purposes, it is only important to stress
that this section has a certain self-suﬃciency in order to focus on it and
avoid considerations on its relation to De caelo as a whole in our analysis.
2.1 Aristotle’s confrontation with the cosmologies of his prede-
cessors
In the monograph on the Earth, as we will call De caelo II, 13-14, Aristotle
faces the issue of the form and the location of the Earth. Chapter 13
is basically an overview of the theses of his predecessors, and chapter
14 is a treatment of his own ones. However, Aristotle presents original
considerations also in chapter 13 while discussing and criticizing others’
theories. He moreover reports some traditional arguments for geocentrism,
although he does not consider them to be cogent. We shall call these
“pseudo-arguments”:
1. Pseudo-argument from the ﬁniteness of the universe: Aristotle ﬁrstly
observes that most of those who hold the universe to be ﬁnite set the
Earth at its center with the exception of the Pythagoreans.3 The his-
torical relevance of this passage lies in the discussion of the cosmology
of the Pythagoreans and the theory of the motion of the Earth with
reference also to Plato’s Timaeus. In the Early Modern Period, sev-
eral followers of Copernicus would interpret Aristotle’s treatment of
the Pythagorean cosmology as evidence of the existence of ancient
supporters of heliocentrism. For the present matter, this passage is
also interesting for Aristotle’s report that the Pythagoreans regarded
the absence of stellar parallax as insuﬃcient evidence of terrestrial
centrality and immobility:4 “Since the Earth’s surface is not in any
case the centre, they [the Pythagoreans] do not feel any diﬃculty
2Paul Moraux, Einige Bemerkungen über den Aufbau von Aristoteles’ Schrift De caelo,
in Museum Helveticum 6 (1949), pp. 157-165: p. 159: “Wenn wir einige durch Ideenas-
soziationen eingeleitete Abschweifungen beiseitelassen, so können wir behaupten, daß
dieser gut abgewogene Plan die strukturelle Einheit der Bücher A und B beweist. Allem
Anschein nach wurden diese Bücher als ein selbständiges Ganzes konzipiert: Ein Zeichen
dafür ist, dass die Abhandlung über die Erde (B 13-14) als der letzte Punkt angekündigt
wird, der zu besprechen ist, um das vorgesehene Programm abzuschließen.”
3De caelo II,13 293 a 19-21. In the following we will quote from the English translation:
Aristotle, On the Heavens (Cambridge, Mass. - London, 1986), transl. by W.K.C.
Guthrie.
4De caelo, II,13 293 b 25-30.
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in supposing that the phenomena are the same although we do not
occupy the centre as they would be if the Earth were in the middle.
For even in the current view [that is, geocentrism] there is nothing to
show that we are distant from the centre by half the Earth’s diam-
eter.” As we shall see, Ptolemy did not take into due account these
remarks.
2. Argument from the fall of bodies:5
Aristotle argues for the centrality and the rest of the Earth from con-
sideration of the fall of bodies. He assumes that a bigger body falls
quicker than a smaller. If the Earth were removed from its central
position, it would reach its point of origin very quickly, as a conse-
quence of its huge dimensions. This argument is remarkable for two
reasons. First, it seems to be based on a petitio principii, that is, it
demonstrates geocentrism through a physical theory which assumes
geocentrism already as a postulate. Second, it assumes that a body
travels downwards the quicker the bigger it is, an assumption which
is supported by empirical evidence only under certain circumstances
when, for instance, the shape of a falling body and the friction of the
medium signiﬁcantly inﬂuence its fall. This argument (which was
already questioned in antiquity by atomistic theories of matter and
motion) is interesting, however, for its historical meaning, since it
waited until the Middle Ages and the Renaissance to abandon the
physical theory upon which it relied. It would be the achievement of
Renaissance scientist-engineers like Giovan Battista Benedetti and
Galileo Galilei to discard this opinion. The Aristotelian passage
proposing the argument from the fall of bodies is also relevant be-
cause it contains an epistemological claim concerning the path that
one should follow to demonstrate the centrality of the Earth:6 “I
mean that we must decide from the very beginning whether bodies
have a natural motion or not, or whether, not having a natural mo-
tion, they have an enforced one. And since our decisions on these
points have already been made, so far as our available means allowed,
we must use them as data.” Accordingly, considerations on motion
or rather on terrestrial motion, should precede considerations on the
structure of the whole universe. Therefore, Aristotle does not ad-
mit discussion on why the Earth and its elements are stable, since
this is the factual presupposition and nothing to be demonstrated.
5De caelo II,13 294 a 11 ﬀ.
6De caelo, II,13 294 b 32 - 295 a 2.
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We could say that, in his treatment, terrestrial physics, in particu-
lar his theory of the natural places of the elements (and of natural
and violent motion), is the presupposition of his conception of the
cosmos7. Aristotle adds to his argument that, if the Earth moved
from its place, a falling body would fall ad inﬁnitum, since it would
encounter no ﬁrm bottom to arrest its downward motion. This con-
sideration, according to Aristotle, elicited discussions among thinkers
on the foundation upon which the elements are placed:8 “Consider
too that if one removed the Earth from the path of one of its particles
before it had fallen, it would travel downwards so long as there was
nothing to oppose it. This question, then, has become, as one might
expect, a subject of general inquiry.” Such inquiry, however, is not
worth being conducted in Aristotle’s eyes. Terrestrial immobility
has an epistemological (and ontological) priority over speculations
depending on cosmic order in general.
3. Pseudo-argument from creation:9 Aristotle remarks that those who
held that the cosmos had an origin also believe that the Earth ag-
glomerated at its center. Not only does Aristotle disagree on the as-
sumption of a “creation” or “origin” of the world (an issue on which
he does not expand here), but he also rejects the argument. If one
assumed with Empedocles that the parts of the Earth were brought
together by a vortex, one would neglect that up and down have an
ontological and epistemological priority over motion. In other words
space determinations should precede spacial displacements:10 “Nor,
again, are heavy and light deﬁned by the vortex: rather, heavy and
light things existed ﬁrst, and then the motion caused them to go
either to the centre or the surface. Light and heavy, then, were
there before the vortex arose (...). In an inﬁnite space there can be
no up and down, yet it is these that distinguish heavy and light.”
7Cf. Paul Moraux, ‘La méthode d’Aristote dans l’étude du ciel De Caelo I 1 – II,12”
in Aristote et les problémes de méthode (Paris-Louvain, 1961), pp. 173-194: p. 182, n.
10: “Il serait trop long de relever tous les cas où, dans l’étude de l’univers et du ciel,
il est fait état des principes de la physique terrestre. Voici pourtant quelques exemples
intéressants. Théorie des quatre éléments, des mouvements et des lieux naturels (...).
Théorie de la pesanteur et lois mécaniques de la chute des corps (...). Théorie de la
génération et de la corruption. Opposition du “selon nature” et “contre nature” ou “par
violence”. Hylémorphisme (...). Existence de détérminations telles que devant-derriére,
droite-gauche, etc., chez les animaux (...).”
8De caelo, I,13 294 a 17-19.
9De caelo II,13 295 a 13 ﬀ.
10De caelo, II,13 295 b 3-9.
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Hence, spacial determinations (up and down) come ﬁrst, then the
determinations of lightness and heaviness and, eventually, motion.
In general terms, one can remark that the argument from creation
is not valid for Aristotle because the centrality and the immobility
of the Earth do not need to be demonstrated from a cosmological
perspective but are already given as sensible evidence.
4. Argument from lightness and heaviness:11 The priority of the theory
of natural places over cosmological considerations is reassessed by
Aristotle also relative to the rest of the Earth at center. According
to Anaximander and others, the reason for that is “indiﬀerence.”’
The Earth is equidistant from all extremes, therefore it maintains its
central position and is at rest. In Aristotle’s eyes, this argument is
ingenious but not true. In fact, he remarks, not only the centrality
of the Earth and its natural tendency toward the center should be
taken into account, but also the upward tendency of ﬁre. The entire
theory of elementary motions should be considered, since only the
Earth falls to the center and not the other elements:12 “The reason
is not impartial relation to the extremes, but motion towards the
centre is peculiar to the Earth.” As a conclusion, Aristotle repeats
that only the theory of motion, in particular the consideration of
the “light-heavy” and “up-down” determinations, bears decisive and
valid arguments relative to geocentricism (see Fig. 2.1.)
2.2 Aristotle’s presentation of his own views
Chapter II,14 deals essentially with Aristotle’s own views. It begins with
considerations concerning terrestrial immobility:13 “For ourselves, let us
ﬁrst state whether it [the Earth] is in motion or at rest”. In fact, some
thinkers believed that the Earth is a celestial body among others and other
philosophers held that it is at the center but spins about its own axis. As
Aristotle already remarked, the former theory belonged to the Pythagore-
ans whereas the latter to Plato. In De caelo, he questions the views of these
predecessors but, as we shall see, he treats the problem beginning with his
theory of motion rather than from a general cosmological perspective.
11De caelo II,13 295 b 10 ﬀ.
12De caelo, II,13 295 b 23-25.
13De caelo, II,14 296 a 24-25.
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Figure 2.1: Left: the center of the sublunary world as ”gravitational” cen-
ter. Right: sublunary world as symmetry center.
1. Argument from the categorization of motion:14 Aristotle objects to
the geokinetic theories of the Pythagoreans and Plato that these
are not compatible with the theory of motion or rather with “his”
theory of motion. A metaphysical premiss is also at stake: the order
of the world is eternal. The reasons for this assumption should be
sought elsewhere. Aristotle assumes also that a “natural motion” is
such that a whole and its parts share the same tendency. As for the
Earth as an element its tendency is “toward the center”, as everyday
experience witnesses. Hence, the hypothetic motion of the Earth like
other planets would be a “violent” or “enforced” motion but, since a
violent motion cannot be eternal, the geokinetik theory would violate
the eternal regularity of nature.
2. Argument from the rise and setting of stars:15 Aristotle remarks that
the terrestrial motion would aﬀect celestial appearances, in particu-
lar the ﬁxed stars. This argument is in striking conﬂict with Aris-
totle’s previous observation that the Pythagoreans did not accept
the argument from stellar parallax as a proper objection against
their planetary conception of the Earth, since its validity depends
on the dimensions of the cosmos. Aristotle’s argument seems to be
rather confused:16 “Secondly, all the bodies which move with the
circular movement are observed to lag behind and to move with
14De caelo II,14 296 a 25 ﬀ.
15De caelo II,14 296 a 34 ﬀ.
16De caelo, II,14 296 a 35 - 296 b 6.
2. Aristotle 11
more than one motion, with the exception of the primary sphere:
the Earth therefore must have a similar double motion, whether it
moves around the centre or is situated at it. But if this were so, there
would have to be passing and turnings of the ﬁxed stars. Yet these
are not observed to take place: the same stars always rise and set at
the same places on the Earth.” It seems plausible that the double
motion of planets to which Aristotle here refers concerns the daily
and the periodical rotations, one along the equator and one along
the ecliptic. It is, however, unclear why the spinning of the Earth at
the center of the world should have more than one motion, if not for
a priori reasons forcing the analogy between the Earth and the other
planets. It is curious that Copernicus’s pupil Rheticus would turn
this argument against Aristotle as he would argue in his Narratio
prima that Copernicus’s threefold terrestrial motion (daily, annual
and “of declination”) agrees with Aristotle’s remark that a planet
must have more than one motion:17
Following Plato and the Pythagoreans, the greatest math-
ematicians of that divine age, my teacher thought that in
order to determine the causes of the phenomena circular
motions must be ascribed to the spehrical Earth. He saw
(as Aristotle also points out) that when one motion is as-
signed to the Earth, it may properly have other motions,
by analogy with the planets. He therefore decided to begin
with the assumption that the Earth has three motions, by
far the most important of all.
To sum up, the general meaning of Aristotle’s argument from the
rise and setting of the stars is clear, but not its details. It should
be additionally noted that this argument is not based on terrestrial
physics, as usual, but rather on astronomical considerations.
3. Argument from the identity of gravitational and cosmological cen-
ter:18 Aristotle remarks that the cosmological and gravitational cen-
ter of the terrestrial element coincide:19 “[...] that the Earth and
the Universe have the same centre [...] we see that weights mov-
ing toward the Earth do not move in parallel lines but always at
the same angles to it [...].” This argument presupposes of course
17Georg Joachim Rheticus, Narratio prima, in Erward Rosen, Three Copernican Trea-
tises (New York, 1959), pp. 147-148
18De caelo II,14 296 b 6 ﬀ.
19De caelo, II,14 296 b 15-16.
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the sphericity of the Earth. This reasoning is therefore not based
on commonsense and intuitive observations, as Aristotle presents it,
but lies in theoretical assumptions (arguments for the spherical form
of the Earth can be found elsewhere, for instance in De caelo II,
14 298 a 7-10). An observer who already knows that the Earth is
spherical and notices that heavy bodies fall vertically to the ground
at all latitudes will conclude that heavy bodies fall straightforwardly
to the center of the Earth. Still, Aristotle remarks that they fall to
the center of the Earth only incidentally. Their tendency is, in fact,
toward the cosmological center. What counts is “place”. Earth goes
to the center like ﬁre to the periphery of the central region of the
universe. Accordingly, the coincidence of terrestrial and cosmologi-
cal center is accidental. In other words, symmetry has an ontological
and epistemological priority over gravitation. Be that as it may, the
conclusion is that the Earth “must be at the center and immobile”
(see Fig. 2.2).
Figure 2.2: Right: Earth as a gravitational center. Falling bodies hit the
Earth’s surface at the same angle (90). Left: gravitational
center is outside the Earth. For a gravitational center lying at
a very remote distance, the falling bodies should hit the earth
surface at parallel lines.
4. Argument from objects thrown upwards: Aristotle adds a remark
concerning objects thrown upwards. They will always come back to
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the ground in a straight line:20 “To our previous reasons we may
add that heavy objects, if thrown forcibly upwards in a straight line,
come back to their starting-place, even if the force hurls them to an
unlimited distance”.
5. Argument from the simplicity of motion:21 This is a reworking of
considerations from natural places. A simple body, as an element,
can have only one motion and cannot simultaneously move toward
and ”away” from the center, as would be the case if the Earth moves.
In that case, in fact, the body’s motion would have a vertical as well
as a horizontal component. Additionally, the whole must be in the
place which its parts tend to reach. Since no force can force the
Earth as a whole to abandon its natural place, it must be at rest at
the center.
6. Conﬁrmation from mathematical astronomy: Mathematical astron-
omy receives very little acknowledgment from Aristotle. Its role is
merely to conﬁrm his views based on mainly physical arguments.
As he writes in the conclusion of his defense of the centrality and
immobility of the Earth:22 “This belief ﬁnds further support in the
assertions of mathematicians about astronomy: that is, the observed
phenomena – the shifting of the ﬁgure by which the arrangement
of the stars is deﬁned – are consistent with the hypothesis that the
Earth lies at the centre. This may conclude our account of the sit-
uation and the rest or motion of the Earth.” This argument will be
later speciﬁed by Ptolemy for the case of possible displacement of the
Earth along the east-west direction. What Aristotle means here is
that the angular distances among stars within certain ‘arrangements’
such as constellations remain constant (see Fig. 2.3).
20De caelo, II,14 296 b 22-25.
21De caelo II,14 b 25 ﬀ.
22De caelo II,14 297 a 2-8.
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Figure 2.3: Argument from mathematical astronomy. The angular dis-
tances between the stars in the same conctellation remain con-
stant.
Chapter 3
Ptolemy
The ﬁrst book of the Almagest starts by mentioning Aristotle’s division of
theoretical philosophy into three primary categories, theology, physics and
mathematics. In the following discussion, Ptolemy makes his point clear:1
...the ﬁrst two divisions of theoretical philosophy should rather
be called guesswork than knowledge, theology because of its
completely invisible and ungraspable nature, physics because
of the unstable and unclear nature of matter; hence there is
no hope that philosophers will ever be agreed about them;
and that only mathematics can provide sure and unshakeable
knowledge to its devotees, provided one approaches it rigor-
ously.
Ptolemy organizes his discussion of mathematical constructs modeling cos-
mic order along this line of thought. His basic principles – geocentrism,
sphericity of the Earth and of the sky – should be veriﬁed by means of
mathematical astronomy. As a professional astronomer he tries to “provide
proofs in all of these topics by using as starting-points and foundations,
as it were, for our search the obvious phenomena, and those observations
made by the ancients and in our own times which are reliable.”2
Ptolemy’s thorough discussion is organized according to the following
scheme (Almagest, I 3 – 8):
1. that the heavens move like a sphere;
2. that the Earth, taken as a whole, is also sensibly spherical;
3. that the Earth is in the middle of the heavens;
4. that the Earth has the ratio of a point to the heavens;
1Almagest I H6, p. 36. Here and in the following we will quote from the English
translation: Toomer, G. J. Ptolemy’s Almagest London: Duckworth, 1984.
2Almagest I H9, p. 38.
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5. that the Earth does not have any motion from place to place;
6. that there are two diﬀerent primary motions in the heavens.
In the following we will discuss the argumentation used by Ptolemy relative
to the ﬁrst ﬁve points. The last point distinguishes between the daily
rotation of the celestial sphere “which carries everything from east to west”
(ﬁrst primary motion) and the motion of Sun, Moon and planets in the
opposite direction relative to the axis, which, in turn, is inclined relative
to the rotational motion of the ﬁrst motion (second primary motion). The
trajectory of the Sun due to this motion (relative to the sphere of the
ﬁxed stars) deﬁnes the ecliptic plane inclined relative to the equator of
the celestial sphere. Ptolemy added to this list a third ‘celestial motion’,
that is, the precession ﬁrst found by Hipparchus and conﬁrmed by Ptolemy
himself. This kind of motion was not yet known in Aristotle’s time.
3.1 The heavens move like a sphere
Let us emphasize that the statement that “the heavens move like a sphere”
was considered by Ptolemy to be logically equivalent to the statement that
“the stars’ trajectories are circular in shape” and vice versa, only because
for him the stars were thought to be ﬁxed on the celestial sphere.3 The
arguments proposed in the Almagest I,3 for the sphericity of the heavens
can be roughly classiﬁed as observational, ‘physical’ and ‘mathematical’.
Ptolemy suggests that ‘the ancients’ came to the concept of the celestial
sphere ﬁrst from the following kind of observations:4
They saw that the Sun, Moon and other stars were carried from
east to west along circles which were always parallel to each
other, that they began to rise up from below the Earth itself,
as it were, gradually got up high, then kept on going round in
similar fashion and getting lower, until, falling to Earth, so to
speak, they vanished completely, then after remaining invisible
for some time, again rose afresh and set; and [they saw] that
the periods of these [motions], and also the places of rising and
settings, were, on the whole, ﬁxed and the same.
3In the second book of his later treatise, Planetary hypotheses, where Ptolemy extends
the mathematical models of the Almagest to the physical realm, stars are thought to
be ﬁxed not on the spherical shell, but rather between nested spherical shells.
4Almagest I H10, p. 38.
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Ptolemy further qualiﬁes the observational evidences for the revolution of
ever-visible stars and the motion of partly invisible stars. The observa-
tional arguments concerning the former, that is that
• their motion is circular and always takes place about one and the
same center;
• that point becomes the pole of the heavenly sphere for observers;
• and those stars which are closer to the pole revolve on smaller circles;
and concerning the latter that:
• those stars that are near the ever-visible stars remain invisible for a
short time;
• and those further away remain invisible for a long time in proportion
to their distance,
are visualized in Fig. 3.1. Obviously, these arguments are of ‘local’ geo-
Figure 3.1: Ever-visible stars and stars that rise and set at a given geo-
graphical position. Here and in the following we will depict
the horizon plane drawn at an observer’s position through a
grey shadowed surface.
graphical character: they can be put forward just after two-night obser-
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vations, without comparison to observational data from diﬀerent places.5
Stars can be observable at some localities and invisible at other places;
they can belong to ever-visible stars at a certain geographical latitude and
to stars that rise and set at other places. The position of the great circle
on the sky which separates these two classes of stars is diﬀerent at diﬀer-
ent latitudes. This fact was possibly not known to Homer (his mention
of ‘arctic circle’ did not imply any geographical dependancy) but was al-
ready widely accepted in Aristotle’s time. That is why Aristotle sounds
anachronistic when he says that some direction “nearly corresponds to the
ever-visible circle” in his famous wind orientation scheme6 – this can be
attributed to the fact that Aristotle was not a professional astronomer.
Discussing the consequences of these observational facts on astronom-
ical knowledge, Ptolemy stresses that “absolutely all phenomena are in
contradiction to the alternative notions which have been propounded.”7
It is interesting to note how deeply the paradigm of the sphericity of the
cosmos has indeed prejudiced his mathematical speculations: in fact, he
oversaw another mathematically equivalent explanation – in a cylindrical
world (see Fig. 3.2) the observational eﬀects would hardly be distinguished
from those observed in a spherical cosmos.8
The other possible mathematical solution overseen by Ptolemy is a
rotational three-axis ellipsoid. For the special sort of such ellipsoid with
two equal axes rotating about the remaining axis, the observational eﬀects
will be the same as in the spherical universe (see Fig. 3.3).
As alternative hypotheses accounting for the visible paths of the stars,
Ptolemy mentions only the untenable opinion (perhaps held by Xeno-
phanes)9 that stellar motions might occur in a straight line towards in-
ﬁnity. It is clear that such motion can be ascribed only to stars that
rise and set, and not to those which are ever-visible and move in circular
paths. In fact, to rule out this hypothesis the above mentioned arguments
are suﬃcient. Nevertheless, Ptolemy proposes10 some other objections:
5Although being intuitively clear, these arguments really need some mathematical
justiﬁcation, namely that the intersection between a plane and a sphere is always a
circle.
6Meteorologica, II, VI, 363 b.
7Almagest I H11, p. 38.
8The authors use the opportunity to thank H. Mendell for a thorough discussion on
the cylindric model in relation to Anaximander.
9Aetius II 24.9: “The same philosopher [Xenophanes] maintains that the Sun goes
forward ad inﬁnitum, and that it only appears to revolve in a circle owing to its distance”.
10Almagest I H11, pp. 38–39.
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Figure 3.2: Observational eﬀects in the “cylindrical universe”. The stars’
visible trajectories are concentric circles; the local horizon de-
ﬁnes the diﬀerent sets of ever-visible stars and stars that rise
and set. The mutual distances between stars remain constant.
One needs astronomical observations arranged in a special way
to distinguish between a spherical and a cylindrical world.
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Figure 3.3: Observational eﬀects in the “ellipsoidal universe”. Fixed stars
lie on the surface of an ellipsoid with two equal axes (a = b)
rotating about an axis perpendicular to the plane deﬁned by
these axes. The stars’ visible trajectories are concentric circles;
the local horizon deﬁnes the diﬀerent sets of ever-visible stars
and stars that rise and set. The mutual distances between stars
remain constant.
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• “...What device could one conceive which would cause each of them
[stars] to appear to begin their motion from the same starting-point
every day?”
• “How could the stars turn back if their motion is towards inﬁnity?”
• “...If they did turn back, how could this not be obvious?”
• In this case “...they must gradually diminish in size until they dis-
appear, whereas, on the contrary, they are seen to be greater at the
very moment of their disappearance ...”
The ﬁrst three counter-arguments have a touch of ‘common sense’ reason-
ing or a purely rhetoric character. The last argument is totally forged:
Ptolemy himself refers to this phenomenon a couple of lines later as be-
ing caused “by the exhalations of moisture surrounding the Earth being
interposed between the place from which we observe and the heavenly
bodies’.’11
Additionally, Ptolemy refers to another hypothesis which he regards as
“completely absurd,” namely, that “the stars are kindled as they rise out of
the Earth and are extinguished again as they fall to Earth.”12 Nevertheless,
he discusses this issue thoroughly.13 Not only the necessity of cosmic
order should rule this hypothesis out – because otherwise “the strict order
in their size and number, their intervals, positions and periods could be
restored by such a random and chance process” (in fact, the process need
not necessarily be “random”) – but also some other objections of special
interest are proposed. Ptolemy mentions that, if this were the case, then
• “...One whole area of the Earth has a kindling nature, and another an
extinguishing one, or rather that the same part [of the Earth] kindles
for one set of observers and extinguishes for another set; and that the
same stars are already kindled or extinguished for some observers,
while they are not yet for others...”
• For the stars which are ever-visible in certain regions and are partly-
visible at others, one should admit “that stars which are kindled and
11This explanation is actualy incorrect; in his later work (Optics, III 60) this phe-
nomenon, now known as a Ponzo-illusion, is correctly explained as a pure psychological
eﬀect.
12Aetius II I3, I4, III 2.II: “According to Xenophanes the stars are made of clouds set
on ﬁre; they are extinguished each day and are kindled at night like coals, and these
happenings constitute their settings and rising respectively.”
13Almagest, I 3 H12, p. 39.
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extinguished for some observers never undergo this process for other
observers.”
These counter-arguments are really of ‘global’ geographical character: they
can be put forward only through comparison of observational information
gained at diﬀerent geographical localities. Ptolemy also presents some
arguments14 which can be roughly classiﬁed as ‘mathematical’:
• “...If one assumes any motion whatever, except spherical, for the
heavenly bodies, it necessarily follows that their distances, measured
from the Earth upwards, must vary, wherever and however one sup-
poses the Earth itself to be situated. Hence the sizes and mutual
distances of the stars must appear to vary for the same observers
during the course of each revolution, since at one time they must be
at a greater distance, at another at a lesser. Yet we see that no such
variations occur.”
• “...Since of diﬀerent shapes having an equal boundary those with
more angles are greater [in area or volume], the circle is greater than
[all other] surfaces, and the sphere greater than [all other] solids15,
[likewise] the heavens are greater than all other bodies.”
• “No other hypothesis can explain how sundial constructions produce
correct results...”
In fact, the ﬁrst argument refers to the constancy of the stars’ mutual
distances and spacial relations. Once more, Ptolemy does not mention
here that the mutual distances between stars would remain intact not
only in a ‘cylindrical’ world but also in a cosmos in the form of an ellipsoid
(see above).
The second counter-argument is of a curiously mixed nature: a cor-
rect mathematical result interbred with a yet naive interpretation of an
extremal principle – a future tradition which survived until G. Leibnitz.
How basic the concept of celestial sphere was for sundial construc-
tions is widely discussed16 in the literature: astronomical calculations with
14Almagest I H13, pp. 39–40.
15Due to Toomer (Almagest, p. 41), these propositions were proved in a work by
Zenodorus, early second century BC.
16See, for example, D. R. Dicks Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle, p. 166: “The
data are very inaccurate for the latitude of Babylon (particularly the equinoctial and
winter solstitial ﬁgures), which is not surprising since the underlying assumption seems
to be that the length of the shadow increases in arithmetical progression with the hight
of the Sun... Moreover, the results are set out according to a predetermined scheme
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gnomons make sense only in the geocentric world and the apex of a gnomon
symbolizes the Earth in the center of the spherical universe. The very visu-
alization of the concept of the celestial sphere with gnomons and its usage
in sundials can be traced back to the analemma construction as discussed
in Vitruvius (see Fig. 3.4).
Figure 3.4: The gnomon AB is placed perpendicular to the horizon plane.
Point R marks the end of the shadow at summer solstice; point
T marks the winter solstice. Cutting the arc HG into halves
and marking this point with F one gets the point of equinox
C at the prolongation of the line AF . Obliquity of the ecliptic
is depicted by the angle RAC.
For completeness and to show the very way of Ptolemy’s argumenta-
tion, we will list the arguments which he himself classiﬁes as ‘physical’:
• “...The motion of the heavenly bodies is the most unhampered and
free of all motions; and freest motion belongs among plane ﬁgures to
the circle and among solid shapes to the sphere [...]”
• “...The aether is, of all bodies, the one with constituent parts which
are ﬁnest and most like each other; now bodies with parts like each
other have surfaces with parts like each other; but the only surfaces
with parts like each other are the circular, among planes, and the
spherical, among three-dimensional surfaces. And since the aether
whereby the solstices and equinoxes are placed arbitrarily on the 15th day of the ﬁrst,
fourth, seventh, and tenth months of a schematic year of twelve months and thirty days
each.”
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is not plane, but three-dimensional, it follows that it is spherical in
shape.”
• “...Nature formed all earthly and corruptible bodies out of shapes
which are round but of unlike parts, but all aetherical and divine
bodies out of shapes which are of like parts and spherical. For if
they were ﬂat or shaped like a discus they would not always display
a circular shape to all those observing them simultaneously from dif-
ferent places on Earth. For this reason it is plausible that the aether
surrounding them, too, being of the same nature, is spherical, and
because of the likeness of its parts moves in a circular and uniform
fashion.”
It is easy to see that the ﬁrst of the ‘mathematical’ and the last of the
‘physical’ arguments presumes that stars as objects have some perceptible
size – this misapprehension would survive until the early modern times.
3.2 The Earth, taken as a whole, is sensibly spherical
The arguments aimed at demonstrating the sphericity of the Earth were
widely known in Antiquity and are repeated by Ptolemy; the speciﬁcation
“taken as a whole” should indicate that one ignores the local irregularities
of the Earth’s surface. For the sake of completeness, Ptolemy also considers
some other possible forms for the Earth (concave, plane, of polygonal
shape, cylindrical) and shows which astronomical evidence would rule out
these cases.
3.3 The Earth is in the middle of the heavens
Ptolemy deals with geocentrism and enlists a series of astronomical argu-
ments in favour of this thesis in Alamagest I,5. Ptolemy tries to consider
all other possible cosmological arrangements with an eccentric Earth and
rules them out on the basis of pure observations. The alternatives are the
following:
1. that the Earth is not on the axis [of the universe] but equidistant
from both poles,
2. it is on the axis but removed towards one of the poles,
3. it is neither on the axis nor equidistant from both poles.
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Figure 3.5: First case: the Earth is equidistant from both poles – two
possible locations.
Let us consider the ﬁrst case. Two possible positions for the Earth are
given in Fig. 3.5.
In order to understand Ptolemy’s arguments, it is useful to recall that
only if the Earth is in the center of the celestial sphere will the Sun rise for
any observer exactly in the eastpoint and set in the westpoint only twice a
year, namely at equinoctials.17 The equinox is deﬁned as a day when the
Sun’s declination  = 0, that is, the Sun’s trajectory lies on the celestial
equator, and the length of the day is equal to the length of the night (see
Fig. 3.6). Ptolemy argues:18
If the image [the Earth] removed towards the zenith or the
nadir of some observer19, then, if he were at sphaera recta,
he would never experience equinox, since the horizon would
always divide the heavens into two unequal parts, one above
17Strictly speaking, the eastern and western directions are deﬁned locally for every
observer relative to the local northern direction; for further considerations, we will use
also a global coordinate system with a northern direction deﬁned through the rotational
axis of the cosmos and eastern-western direction coinciding with the intersection line
between the ecliptic and equatorial plane.
18Almagest I H17, p. 41.
19Here, Ptolemy explicitly implies that the Earth’s size is negligible in comparison to
the distance to the stars; otherwise, the Earth would not be equidistant from both
poles.
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Figure 3.6: Equinox: the Sun’s declination  = 0 and the visible path of the
Sun coincides with the celestial equator. The Sun rises directly
in the east and sets directly in the west direction for every
observer on the Earth’s surface. Here and in the following, we
will depict the visible path of the Sun above the horizon plane
with a yellow line.
and one below the Earth; if he were at sphaera obliqua, either,
again, equinox would never occur at all, or [if it did occur], it
would not be at a position halfway between summer and winter
solstices, since these intervals would necessarily be unequal,
because the equator, which is the greatest of all parallel circles
drawn about the poles of the [dayly] motion, would no longer
be bisected by the horizon; instead [the horizon would bisect]
one of the circles parallel to the equator, either to the north or
to the south of it. Yet absolutely everyone agrees that these
intervals are equal everywhere on Earth, since [everywhere] the
increment of the longest day over the equinoctial day at the
summer solstice is equal to the decrement of the shortest day
from the equinoctial day at the winter solstice.
Ptolemy considers separately two possible positions of observation, one at
the equator (sphaera recta) and another at an arbitrary latitude (sphaera
obliqua). He concludes, in fact, that in both cases one would never ex-
perience equinox, since the horizon would always divide the heavens into
two unequal parts. The argumentation is visualized in Fig. 3.7. The com-
pleteness of Ptolemy’s analysis of the astronomical consequences of this
case can be seen from his notice that it can nevertheless happen that one
observes the same lengths of day and night at sphaera obliqua. But in
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Figure 3.7: The Sun’s declination  = 0. Observational situation at
sphaera recta (left) and at sphaera obliqua (right).
this case that will happen not at the true equinoctial date when the solar
declination  = 0 but at some other date (see Fig. 3.8)!
The next step in Ptolemy’s analysis is to consider the observational con-
sequences of the Earth’s displacement along the east-west direction. He
proposes the following counter-arguments:20
• The sizes and distances of the stars in this case would not remain
constant and unchanged at eastern and western horizons.
• The time-interval from rising to culmination would not be equal to
the interval from culmination to setting.
Having considered and ruled out the possible symmetrical displace-
ment of the Earth from the rotational axis of the universe, Ptolemy begins
to consider the astronomical consequences of the possible displacement of
the Earth along the north-south direction along the rotational axis. He
concludes21 that in this case:
• The plane of the horizon would divide the heavens into unequal parts,
diﬀerent for diﬀerent latitudes.
• The plane of the ecliptic would be divided by the plane of the horizon
also into unequal parts; instead the six zodiacal signs are visible
above the Earth at all times and places, while the remaining six are
invisible.
20Almagest I H18, p. 42.
21Almagest I H18–19, p. 42.
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Figure 3.8: “False equinox”: the Earth is not on the rotational axis of
the universe but equidistant from both poles. One can possi-
bly observe the same length of day and night not at the true
equinoctial date  = 0 but at some other date with some other
Sun’s declination 1.
Figure 3.9: Displacement in the east direction. Stars appear to be bigger
in east direction and smaller in west direction. The moment
of culmination did not lie in the middle of the time-interval
between the rising and setting of stars.
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Figure 3.10: Displacement in the east direction. The angular distances be-
tween the stars in the same constellation appear to be bigger
in east direction and smaller in west direction.
• Only at sphaera recta could the horizon bisect the celestial sphere.
• The shadow of the gnomon at equinoxes at sunrise would no longer
form a straight line with its shadow at sunset in a plane parallel to
the horizon, not even sensibly.
The ﬁrst and third arguments can be easily understood with the help of
Fig. 3.11 and 3.12. The last (fourth) argument in the list is of special
interest:
[...] if the Earth were not situated exactly below the [celestial]
equator, but were removed towards the north or south in the
direction of one of the poles, the result would be that at the
equinoxes the shadow of the gnomon at sunrise would no longer
form a straight line with its shadow at sunset in a plane parallel
to the horizon, not even sensibly.
Actually, this is an old ‘evidence’ for geocentricism, which was used as a
proof also by Pliny in his Natural History:22
22Pliny, Natural History I, chapt. 70.
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Figure 3.11: Displacement of the Earth along the rotational axis of the
universe: the plane of the horizon would divide the heavens
into unequal parts, diﬀerent for diﬀerent latitudes.
Figure 3.12: Displacement of the Earth along the rotational axis of the
universe: Only at sphaera recta could the horizon bisect the
celestial sphere.
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It is demonstrated by dioptra, which aﬀords the most decisive
conﬁrmation of the fact, that unless the Earth was in the mid-
dle, the days and nights could not be equal; for, at the time of
the equinox, the rising and setting of the Sun, are seen on the
same line, and the rising of the Sun, at the summer solstice,
is on the same line with its setting at the winter solstice; but
this could not happen if the the Earth was not situated in the
centre.
A visualization of the above mentioned argument for the case of the
equinox in Pliny is given in Fig. 3.13.
Figure 3.13: Pliny’s argument: at equinoxes the sunrise and sunset points
can be observed along the same line with a dioptra; therefore,
the observer is located at the intersection of two great circles,
that is one is placed in the middle of the universe.
A similar line of argumentation can be found in Euclid:23
Let Cancer, at point   in the east, be observed through a
dioptra placed at point , and then through the same dioptra
Capricorn will be observed in the west at point A. Since points
A  are all observed through the dioptra, the line A  is
straight.
It should be noted that Cancer and Capricorn as zodiacal signs are not
observable as points on the celestial sphere; on the other hand, the position
of the Sun at summer solstice is marked by its entrance in the tropic of
Cancer and the longitudinal diﬀerence between the two signs is equal to
23Euclid, Phaenomena, I.
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180 degrees. That means that Pliny’s argument can be just a reformula-
tion of the ‘mental observation’24 illustrated by Euclid. It is remarkable
that Ptolemy uses this statement only as a counter-argument.
Ptolemy rounded up his argumentation for the third case (the Earth is nei-
ther on the rotational axis nor equidistant from both poles) by concluding
that it is impossible because “the sorts of objection which we made to the
ﬁrst [two] will both arise in that case.”25
The last reason for the central position of the Earth comes from the
observation of the Moon’s eclipses:26
Furthermore, eclipses of the Moon would not be restricted to
situations where the moon is diametrically opposite the Sun
(whatever part of the heaven [the luminaries are in])27, since
the Earth would often come between them when they are not
diametrically opposite, but at intervals of less than a semi-
circle.
Ptolemy does not discuss this argument in detail: in fact, it presupposes
that both the Sun and Moon have a circular motion around the center of
the cosmos – this is certainly not the case for the lunar and solar theories
developed in the Almagest.
3.4 The Earth has the ratio of a point to the heavens
One should emphasize that Ptolemy’s statements considered above are
practically all valid only if one neglects the Earth’s size in comparison to
the size of the universe. His continuous repetition of the word sensibly
clearly indicates that he himself was aware of the intrinsic precision of
his ‘proofs’. The arguments presented in this section should in fact give
the necessary justiﬁcation of the approximation used in the ‘proofs’ of the
previous sections. The following arguments are proposed:28
• “the sizes and the distances of the stars, at any given time, appear
equal and the same from all parts of the Earth everywhere, as ob-
servations of the same [celestial] objects from diﬀerent latitudes are
found to have not the least discrepancy from each other”;
24To our knowledge, this kind of observation was in fact never made: not only the
atmospheric refraction but also a ﬁnal size of the Sun would make the precision of such
‘proofs’ mathematically invalid.
25Almagest I H19, p. 42.
26Almagest I H19, p. 42.
27That is, at opposition, at full Moons.
28Almagest I H21, p. 43.
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• “the gnomons set up in any part of the Earth [...] and likewise
the centers of armillary spheres, operate like the real center of the
Earth; that is, the lines of sight [to heavenly bodies] and the paths
of shadows caused by them agree as closely with the [mathemati-
cal] hypotheses explaining the phenomena as if they actually passed
through the real center-point of the Earth”;
• “the planes drawn through the observer’s lines of sight at any point,
which we call ‘horizons’, always bisect the whole heavenly sphere”.
The very nature of astronomical observations, however, limits the precision
of these arguments to a perceptible level – a fact which was not lost on
Ptolemy. Once more, he has to repeat that “the Earth has, to the senses,
the ratio of a point to the distance of the sphere of the so-called ﬁxed
stars”.29 What is now missing are the arguments which could rule out
the displacement relative to the center of the universe which were of the
Earth’s size. Such displacement would not be observable with the precision
of naked-eye astronomy but could be monitored in frames of Aristotle’s
physics through terrestrial observation.
3.5 The Earth does not have any motion from place to place
As we have seen, Ptolemy thinks that geocentrism can be suﬃciently
demonstrated through astronomical considerations based on geometry and
observation up to a perceptible level.
Nevertheless, he does not use the physical arguments against the mo-
tion of the Earth in Almagest I, 7 to rule out the possiblity of a tiny central
displacement of the Earth. Unlike Aristotle, he seems to regard these ar-
guments as irrelevant for demonstration of the centrality of the Earth.
Ptolemy argues that the fall of bodies can be regarded as a corollary of
geocentrism instead of an argument for it:30
One can show by the same arguments [provided in support of
the centrality of the Earth] that the Earth cannot have any
motion in the aforementioned directions, or even move at all
from its position at the center. [...] Hence I think it is idle to
seek for causes for the motion of objects toward the center, once
29We can only agree here with the comment of Toomer that the classiﬁcation ‘so-called’
used for the ﬁxed stars means that for Ptolemy the stars did in fact have a motion –
that is, precession.
30Almagest, I,7 p. 43.
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it has been so clearly established from the actual phenomena
that the Earth occupies the middle place in the universe, and
that the heavy objects are carried toward the Earth.
Ptolemy, exactly like Aristotle (see Fig. 2.2, right) observes that the fall of
heavy bodies toward the center is evident since31 “the direction and path
of the motion [...] of all bodies possessing weight is always and everywhere
at right angles to the rigid plane drawn tangent to the point of impact.”
Additionally, Ptolemy reviews a series of physical considerations which he
could derive from De caelo, although his opinions diverge from Aristotle’s.
Firstly, he discusses the fact that the Earth is not supported by anything in
its position at the center of the universe. Unlike Aristotle32, he reassesses
the “argument of equilibrium for indiﬀerence” ascribed to Anaximander in
De caelo. In fact, as one reads, “that which is relatively smallest should be
overpowered from and pressed in equally from all directions to a position
of equilibrium.”33 Additionally, he aﬃrms that there is no up and down in
the universe, since directions depend on the observer. This statement is
at odds with Aristotelian cosmology. In De caelo II,2 one reads that the
heavens have an up and down, a right and a left, a back and forth. This
idea is supported by an analogy between the heavens and animals which
are beings capable of moving themselves. In spite of his independence from
Aristotle, Ptolemy assumes34 along with him that a body falls down faster
the bigger it is. This is also according to him an argument against the
displacement of the Earth from its center, toward which it has a natural
tendency. Moreover 35, “living things and individual heavy objects would
be left behind, riding on the air, and the Earth itself would very soon have
fallen completely out of the heavens. But such things are utterly ridiculous
merely to think of”. Although physical arguments are not essential to
demonstrate the centrality of the Earth, according to Ptolemy they are
decisive for rejecting the axial rotation of the Earth, an issue which he
explicitly tackles:36
...although there is perhaps nothing in the celestial phenomena
which would count against that hypothesis, at least from sim-
pler considerations, nevertheless from what would occur here
31Almagest, I, 7 p. 43.
32De caelo, II, 13.
33Almagest, I, 7 p. 43.
34Almagest, I, 7 p. 44.
35Ibid.
36Almagest, H25, p. 45.
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on Earth and in the air, one can see that such a notion is quite
ridiculous.
As we have seen, Aristotle ascribes the same argumentation to Plato.37
Ptolemy’s arguments against the axial rotation of the Earth (and ter-
restrial motion in general) became famous after Copernicus’s refutation in
the ﬁrst book of his major work. They are basically derived from the ex-
cessive velocity of the terrestrial spinning and the supposition that ﬂying
and thrown objects would be left behind by the terrestrial motion.
37We will not take into account here the inaccurate comparison between Aristotle’s and
Ptolemy’s physics in Olaf Pedersen, A Survey of the Almagest (Odense, 1974), 43-45.
On the one hand, Pedersen uncritically assumes the Aristotelian background of Ptolemy.
On the other hand, he interprets Almagest I, 7 anachronistically and extrinsically, using
meaningless expressions like “an immense pressure of the ether molecules”. On top of
this, Pederson erroneusly equates the theory of the central Earth spinning on its axis
with heliocentrism.

Chapter 4
Conclusions and perspectives
In the Almagest, Ptolemy’s argumentative strategy in favor of geocentrism
is clearly the reverse of that employed by Aristotle in De caelo, II, 13-14.
Whereas the natural philosopher derived the centrality (and immobility)
of the Earth from his theory of the elements, that is, form “physical” obser-
vations and assumptions, the Hellenistic astronomer derived similar con-
clusions from geometrical-astronomical considerations. Aristotle explicitly
regarded mathematical astronomical or rather cosmological arguments as
secondary. In his opinion, they merely corroborated his natural demon-
stration. In a certain sense, one can say that he built his cosmology on the
basis of theories concerning terrestrial physics (the theory of the elements).
Ptolemy reversed, at least in the relevant passages of the Almagest, Aris-
totle’s perspective as he considered physical arguments to be secondary:
“Hence I think it is idle to seek for causes for the motion of objects to-
wards the centre, once it has been so clearly established from the actual
[astronomical] phenomena that the Earth occupies the middle place in the
universe”.1 According to him, physics descends from cosmology and not
the other way round. As we have seen, elementary observational phenom-
ena, like the fall of bodies, do not require further explanation once the
spherical form of the heavens and the centrality of the Earth have been
demonstrated. It is precisely the inverse of Aristotle, for whom the theory
of the elements comes ﬁrst.2
Still, to account for this divergent approach to geocentricism, the
classical distinction between mathematical and physical astronomy is not
suﬃcient. Averroes and scholastic philosophers criticized several aspects
of Ptolemaic astronomy from a natural or “physcal” perspective. The
geometrical models for planetary motions seemed to be at odds with ba-
sic assumptions of Aristotle like the uniform circularity of celestial mo-
tions or the concentricity of heavenly spheres. Ptolemy was therefore ac-
1Almagest, I, 7.
2We leave a treatment of Ptolemy’s physics and physical premisses as a prospect for
further research based on Planetary hypotheses and Tetrabiblos.
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cused of neglecting natural philosophy and his mathematical models were
deemed unable to explain the real nature of the universe. Accordingly,
it became usual to distinguish mathematics and physics, description and
explanation. This separation was still at work in the homocentric cos-
mologies of the early sixteenth century, as was the case with the Italian
Aristotelians Amico and Fracastoro. In the framework of the Copernican
debate, there were several attempts to distinguish mathematical and phys-
ical astronomy, in order to avoid a conﬂict between Copernican tables and
Aristotelian physics. Mathematical astronomy should only provide use-
ful models for celestial computation, whereas philosophy should deal with
natural causes. Theologians were particularly severe in maintaining this
distinction which entailed also a hierarchic understanding of the levels of
knowledge: mathematical, philosophical and, at top, revealed. Notably,
this position was stubbornly supported by the Lutheran theologian An-
dreas Osiander, author of the conventionalist anonymous introduction to
De revolutionibus, and later by the Catholic Inquisitor Roberto Bellarmino,
who played a decisive role in the trials of Bruno and of the heliocentric the-
ory. Both limited mathematical astronomy to computation or, as Duhem
put it, to “save the phenomena” (sozein ta phainomena).From our analy-
sis it has become clear, however, that Ptolemy’s and Aristotle’s arguments
for geocentrism cannot be traced back to the separation between abstract
mathematical models and real physical causes (Averroes and scholastic)
nor to the separation of computation and explanation (Osiander and Bel-
larmino). In fact, they show a more general divergence in the treatment
of nature. This is an ontological and an epistemological diﬀerence at the
same time. On the one hand, Aristotle tackles geocentricism from the
perspective of a qualitative philosophy of nature, especially his theory of
elementary motion. On the other hand, Ptolemy relies on a mathematical
understanding of the cosmos as a whole. The former derives cosmology
from terrestrial physics, whereas the latter proceeds in the opposite direc-
tion. It should be remarked that, in this respect, Copernicus would follow
in Ptolemy’s footsteps, claiming in book one of De revolutionibus that ter-
restrial physics should be corrected to agree with his general cosmological
assumptions, beginning with the Earth’s motion. The divergence between
Aristotle and Ptolemy is that between a qualitative and a mathematical
approach to nature as well as that between a terrestrial and a heavenly
perspective.
Concerning Ptolemy’s epistemology – one could say, his ‘mathemat-
ical epistemology’ – an enlightening introduction to it is the ﬁrst chapter
of the ﬁrst book of the Almagest, which contains interesting philosophical
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considerations and claims. Ptolemy mentions the Aristotelian idea that
there are three speculative disciplines, physics, mathematics and theology,
possibly relying on Metaphysics V,1 or similar passages. However, he al-
ters Aristotle’s perspective, since he exploits this quotation to extoll ﬁrstly
the nobility of mathematics and to hint, in the following, even at the su-
periority of mathematics over the other two speculative disciplines. This
superiority concerns at least the certainty of its demonstrations. Whilst
philosophers will never reach an agreement in their speculations as a con-
sequence of the profound uncertainty of their discipline, “mathematics can
provide sure and unshakable knowledge to its devotees, provided one ap-
proaches it rigorously. For its kind of proof proceeds by indisputable meth-
ods, namely arithmetic and geometry.”3 In a very Platonic mood, Ptolemy
surmises that mathematics gives access to divine things, because its ob-
jects occupy a position between the sensible and the intelligible, between
the changing reality given to our perceptions and the eternal, unchanging
realm of divinity.4 With a fruitful intuition, Ptolemy adds that mathe-
matics helps also physics “for almost every peculiar attribute of material
nature becomes apparent from the peculiarities of its motion from place
to place.”5 Needless to say, both the idea of a mathematical theology and
that of a mathematical theory of motions are in contrast with Aristotle’s
metaphysics and his hylomorphic physics. Ptolemy adds some consider-
ations on the providential design underlying nature, which owes much to
Pythagoreanism and Platonism:6
With regard to virtuous conduct in practical actions and char-
acter, this science, above all things, could make men see clearly;
from the constancy, order, symmetry and calm which are as-
sociated with the divine, it makes its followers lovers of this
divine beauty, accustoming them and reforming their natures,
as it were, to a similar spiritual state.
A cosmological perspective like that of Ptolemy virtually entails a
reinvestment of Aristotelian physics once the arguments for terrestrial cen-
trality are demonstrated to be invalid from an astronomical perspective,
as Copernius did in the ﬁrst book of De revolutionibus. Copernicus’s plan-
etary system challenged physics from a cosmological perspective but not
Ptolemaic epistemology, on which his method precisely relied.
3Almagest p. 36.
4Almagest p. 36.
5Almagest p. 36.
6Almagest pp. 36-37.
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The “Aristotelian-Ptolemaic system” is a medieval and early modern
product. The convergence of the general cosmological conclusions of De
caelo and of Almagest, in spite of their diﬀerent approaches, led to a uniﬁed
geocentric cosmology based on arguments derived from both sources, as
Sacrobosco witnesses. From the twelfth to the seventeenth century, univer-
sity students learning the basics of spherical astronomy from Sacrobosco’s
De sphaera would receive the impression of a profound unity between the
two principal sources of ancient cosmology, Aristotle and Ptolemy, rela-
tive to the essential features of the cosmos and the reasons they brought
forward. Sacrobosco traced his general cosmological views back to the
authority of these two sources, although he had only limited or indirect
access to the original texts. As a matter of fact, he skipped, shortened
or oversimpliﬁed the arguments of Aristotle and Ptolemy, and tended to
present their shared opinions as part of the same conception. Although
the commentators of Aristotle, especially through Averroes, became aware
of the contrast between the homocentric planetary model propounded by
their “master” and the epicyclic-eccentric geometrical devices of Ptolemy,
the image of an Aristotelian-Ptolemaic worldview as a unity was not aban-
doned and later was even strengthened as an eﬀect of the post-Copernican
debate. This fundamental agreement became almost commonplace. Ac-
cording to Galilei’s renowned Dialogo, for instance, the chief world systems
were only two: the Ptolemaic and the Copernican, the ﬁrst one coinciding
with the Aristotelian. Kuhn’s account of the “Copernican revolution” owes
much to this interpretative schema. By contrast, this paper has pointed
out the diﬀerent, if not opposite, approaches in Aristotle’s and Ptolemy’s
treatment of a fundamental cosmological issue on which regard they are
usually mentioned together: geocentricism. A new attention to epistemo-
logical tensions between the two main classics of cosmology pertaining to
methodology and philosophy of knowledge helps us understand that there
is no “traditional”, “ancient” or “Greek” cosmology. This suggests that
the ancient world experienced a theoretical, philosophical and cultural va-
riety that can be easily overlooked from the modern perspective. In fact,
not only have we often received a crystallized image of Greek knowledge,
but also dispose of works which are themselves great syntheses that over-
shadow and hide previous debates and multiplicity. Just as Aristotle’s
De caelo superseded previous cosmologies, Ptolemy’s Almagest superseded
previous mathematical astronomy. The work of the historian of ancient
cosmology shall therefore be to highlight argumentative tensions, decon-
struct the alleged unity of the views of singular authors or epochs, and seek
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to obtain an insight into the cultural pluralism of debates that history and
tradition has veiled.
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